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Mission Impossible? International Law and
the Changing Character of War
John F. Murphy*
As a participant in the conference “International Law and the ChangingCharacter of War,” in this article I hope to present and support the thesis re-
flected in the title to this essay, i.e., that the use and abuse of international law and
the changing character of war have combined to place major obstacles in the way of
the successful prosecution of armed conflict by US forces and their allies. In sup-
port of this thesis, I shall be drawing extensively on examples arising out of “the
changing character of weapon systems” panel, but I shall also be exploring other
dimensions of “the changing character of war” to buttress this support.
I. Challenges Posed by the Changing Character of Weapon Systems
In the panel “The Changing Character of Weapon Systems: Unmanned Systems/
Unmanned Vehicles,” an overarching theme was the issue whether the use of these
new weapon systems was compatible with international law. As noted in particular
in Professor Pedrozo’s article,1 the criticisms of the use of unmanned systems to at-
tack adversaries outside of traditional combat zones like Afghanistan and Iraq have
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been especially sharp. The primary focus of the critics has been on the Central In-
telligence Agency’s (CIA) use of armed drones, a prime example of an unmanned
aerial system or unmanned aerial vehicle, to kill leaders of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda
in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan.
I make no attempt to address all of the numerous arguments advanced by the
critics of the drone attacks, but rather limit my discussion to two closely related ar-
guments: first, that the civilian nature of the CIA personnel utilizing the armed
drones precludes them from engaging in armed conflict, and if they engage in
armed conflict, this renders them “unlawful combatants”; and second, outside of
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States is not engaged in an armed conflict with
the Taliban, Al-Qaeda or any other militant or terrorist group. If such attacks occur
outside of an armed conflict, they must be treated as criminal acts and not armed
attacks that give rise to the right to use military force in self-defense. Rather, they
must be combated by law enforcement measures and governed by international
human rights law, not the law of armed conflict, or, as some prefer to call it, inter-
national humanitarian law. Because armed drones are not law enforcement tools,
the critics contend, they may not be used outside of combat zones.
The Effect of the CIA’s Status as a Civilian Government Agency
One of the most persistent critics of the CIA’s use of armed drones has been Mary
Ellen O’Connell, holder of the Robert & Marion Short Chair in Law at Notre Dame
University. According to Professor O’Connell, the CIA is not bound by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice of the United States to respect the laws and customs
of war and therefore it does not.2 Moreover, according to O’Connell:
Under the law of armed conflict, only lawful combatants have the right to use force
during an armed conflict. Lawful combatants are the members of a state’s regular
armed forces. The CIA are not members of the U.S. armed forces. They do not wear
uniforms. They are not subject to the military chain of command. They are not trained
in the laws of war, including the fundamental targeting principles of distinction, neces-
sity, proportionality, and humanity.3
O’Connell’s remarks presume that the law of armed conflict governs the CIA’s
use of armed drones in the FATA in Pakistan. This is a debatable point; we shall re-
turn to the issue below. But assuming arguendo that it does, the law of armed con-
flict does not prohibit civilians, including intelligence agents, from participating in
hostilities. As Pedrozo points out,4 even Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, in his study on targeted killings,
has conceded this point.5 Moreover, the use of armed drones by CIA personnel
does not necessarily constitute a war crime if it results in a death in the FATA.6
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Only if the killing itself is conducted in a manner prohibited by the law of armed
conflict, e.g., it involves the deliberate targeting of civilians not directly participat-
ing in hostilities, does it constitute a war crime. Under such circumstances, it is ir-
relevant who conducts the targeted killing, intelligence personnel or State armed
forces; the actor who committed the killing, plus those who authorized it, can be
prosecuted for war crimes.7
The civilian status of the CIA personnel does have other significant conse-
quences. First, if they are captured by the enemy, they are not entitled to prisoner of
war status. It is a matter of some debate whether they are to be treated as civilians or
as unlawful combatants while they are detained.8 Second, they may be attacked, ei-
ther as members of an organized armed group or as civilian direct participants in
hostilities. Third, they enjoy no belligerent immunity for their actions and thus
may be prosecuted, either for war crimes (e.g., deliberately killing civilians) or do-
mestic crimes (e.g., murder) in a national court.9 In other words, the absence of the
right on the part of CIA personnel to participate directly in hostilities within the
meaning of Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol I10 has consequences, but is not in
itself a violation of the law of armed conflict.
At this writing, the media are full of commentary on the release of 75,000 US mili-
tary documents on the war in Afghanistan by WikiLeaks. Although much of the
commentary has focused on reports in the documents of Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate assisting the Taliban in Afghanistan in their use of impro-
vised explosive devices (IEDs) against members of the Afghan government and co-
alition forces, there are also many reports in the documents of the fallibility of
aerial drones. For example, one document reported that communications were
lost with a Reaper drone, armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, and
an F-15 fighter plane had to be ordered to shoot it down before it crossed into
Tajikistan.11 These documents also reportedly indicate that some reports of civilian
casualties were never made public.12
At this writing there are also conflicting reports about an attack by coalition
forces occurring on July 23, 2010 that Afghan sources claim killed fifty-two civil-
ians, a claim that has been denied by NATO officials, who stated that an investiga-
tion NATO was conducting “has thus far revealed no evidence of civilians injured
or killed.”13 To be sure, reports of large numbers of civilians killed in Afghanistan
are not something new. Indeed, tensions between the Karzai government and the
US government over civilian casualties allegedly caused by airstrikes have been a
long-standing problem. As I stated on another occasion:
Although the law of armed conflict clearly prohibits an intentional direct attack against
the civilian population as such, and indeed categorizes it as a war crime, “there can be
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no assurance attacks against combatants and other military objectives will not result in
civilian casualties in or near such military objectives.” In the latter case, the civilian ca-
sualties are known as “collateral damage” and do not give rise to accountability of the
attacker. Nonetheless, as the sovereign government of Afghanistan, President Karzai
can order the complete cessation of airstrikes (he has done so on occasion), and as a
matter of international law, the United States and its allies are bound to comply—even
though such airstrikes are a crucially important factor in the battle against the Taliban,
and the Taliban regularly intermingle among the civilian population in order to use
them as human shields (itself a violation of the law of armed conflict) and then use ci-
vilian casualties as part of their war propaganda effort. In short, the Taliban has been
successfully engaging in so-called “lawfare,” using false accusations of violations of the
jus in bello in order to win public opinion to their side.14
Although the documents released by WikiLeaks apparently do not report the in-
tentional targeting of civilians by CIA personnel in either Afghanistan or Pakistan,
they do “suggest that the CIA has sharply increased its use of paramilitary units in
Afghanistan, and provide details of unintended killings of civilians by Task Force
373, a secret unit set up to kill or capture militant leaders.”15 Such unintended kill-
ings do not constitute war crimes but they greatly undermine the war effort and in-
crease the pressure on the Afghan government to prevent their recurrence,16 as well
as provide material for the Taliban war propaganda effort.
The civilian status of the CIA drones also has legal significance. Rule 17 (a) of
the air and missile warfare manual,17 which, while it has no official status, is the
product of a team of experts on the law of armed conflict and has been well received
by governments, provides that only military aircraft are entitled to engage in armed
attacks. There is no question that CIA drones are not military aircraft. It is arguable
that rule 17 (a) of the manual reflects customary international law. If this argument
is valid, the use of CIA drones in an international armed conflict would be a viola-
tion of the customary law of armed conflict.18
There is a serious issue, however, as to whether the CIA drones are being used in
an “international armed conflict,” because of the ambiguity of the concept as ap-
plied to current circumstances. In his leading treatise on the law of international
armed conflict, Yoram Dinstein defines an international armed conflict as limited
to conflicts “raging between two or more sovereign States.”19 As Dinstein acknowl-
edges, however, “drawing a line of demarcation between inter-State and intra-
State armed conflicts is not as simple as it appears to be at a cursory glance.”20 He
points to Afghanistan in 2001 as an example. Prior to 2001 the Taliban regime
fought a long-standing civil war with the Northern Alliance, which clearly consti-
tuted solely an internal armed conflict. In 2001, however, the Taliban regime,
which because of its control over most of the territory of Afghanistan constituted
the de facto government of Afghanistan, “got itself embroiled in an inter-State war
16
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with an American-led Coalition as a result of providing shelter and support to the
Al-Qaeda terrorists who had launched the notorious attack against the US on
11 September of that year . . . .”21
Under current circumstances, however, the Taliban are no longer the de facto
government of Afghanistan. Rather, the Karzai government is both the de facto
and de jure government of Afghanistan. For their part the Taliban are involved in
an insurgency against the Karzai government and use the FATA as a safe haven
from which their forces and Al-Qaeda forces launch cross-border attacks into Af-
ghanistan. Moreover, because of the deteriorating situation between the Taliban in
Pakistan and the Pakistan government, it is arguable that the Taliban in Pakistan
have launched an insurgency against the Pakistan government.
If this scenario has some plausibility, then some further comments by Dinstein
may be apposite:
A non-international armed conflict arising in State A may also have spillover horizon-
tal effects within a neighboring country (State B). . . . In this scenario, insurgents
against the Government of State A find temporary shelter within State B and ignite an-
other “civil war,” this time against the Government of State B. As long as the two gov-
ernments of States A and B (acting separately or in cooperation with each other) wage
hostilities against the insurgents, the two simultaneous conflicts—despite their cross-
border effect—remain non-international in character. But if the two Governments be-
come embroiled in combat against each other, the armed conflict changes its character
and becomes inter-State.22
One may plausibly argue that Afghanistan and Pakistan are currently in the
same position as States A and B in Dinstein’s hypothetical. If so, it needs to be
noted further that, although there are tensions between the Pakistan and Karzai
governments, there is at present no armed combat between them. It well may be,
then, that the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan should be classified as
non-international in character.
If it is correct to classify both of these conflicts as non-international, the civil sta-
tus of CIA personnel or of CIA drones becomes irrelevant. This is because there is
no counterpart in the law of non-international armed conflicts to Article 43(2) of
Additional Protocol I. To the contrary, States often use their police and intelligence
services in the fight against rebels. As to the status of aircraft, rule 17 (a) of the air
and missile warfare manual’s requirement that only military aircraft are entitled to
engage in armed attacks expressly does not apply to non-international armed
conflicts.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,23 the US Supreme
Court rejected the assertion by the US government that since Al-Qaeda was not a
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State and had not accepted to be governed by the rules set forth in the Geneva Con-
ventions, its affiliates could not invoke their protections. Rather, the Court held
that the so-called “war on terror” was a non-international armed conflict, and
therefore that at a minimum Article 3, which is common to all the Geneva Conven-
tions, applies to the conflict with Al-Qaeda. The validity of this holding as a matter
of international law is debatable, however, since, as Dinstein has argued, “from the
vantage point of international law . . . a non-international armed conflict cannot
possibly assume global dimensions.”24 Michael Schmitt buttresses this conclusion
by noting that Common Article 3 itself defines the conflict to which it applies as
“not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties.”25
Even the language Schmitt quotes from Common Article 3, however, has been
subject to different interpretations. On the one hand, it can be interpreted as refer-
ring only to “internal” armed conflicts, that is, civil wars or insurgencies. This ap-
pears to be the interpretation Schmitt favors. On the other hand, it can be
interpreted as referring more broadly to any armed conflict that is not between
States. This appears to be the interpretation that the US Supreme Court in Hamdan
favors. Under the latter approach the phrase means occurring in the territory of “at
least one of the High Contracting Parties.”26
These arguments favoring conflicting interpretations of Common Article 3,
while interesting, need not be resolved for purposes of resolving the issue of the ef-
fect of the CIA’s civilian status, because neither interpretation would support the
proposition that the “war on terror” is an international armed conflict. In this case,
then, the civilian status of the CIA is irrelevant for determining whether the CIA’s
use of drones is compatible with international law.
As Schmitt has noted, however, the Supreme Court in Hamdan “neglected to
explain how it arrived at the determination that the ‘war’ with Al Qaeda qualified as
an ‘armed conflict,’ a term of art in the law of war”27 and the “condition precedent
for applicability of the law of war.”28 We now turn to this issue.
Is the United States Engaged in an Armed Conflict with Al-Qaeda or Any
Other Militant or Terrorist Group?
Neither the Geneva Conventions nor Additional Protocol I contains a definition of
an “armed conflict.” In contrast, Additional Protocol II defines non-international
armed conflicts in such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol.29 Para-
graph 1 of Article 1 of Additional Protocol II applies to all armed conflicts not cov-
ered by Additional Protocol I and
18
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which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.
Paragraph 2 of Additional Protocol II then provides that “[t]this Protocol shall not
apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed
conflicts.”
In the 1995 Tadic Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,30 the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia addressed the preliminary issue of the
existence of an armed conflict in response to a contention by the defendant that
there had been no active hostilities in the area of the alleged crimes at the relevant
time:
[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force be-
tween States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and or-
ganized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International
humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-
yond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the
case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, interna-
tional humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party,
whether or not actual combat takes place there.31
The question whether the US conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an armed con-
flict is not easily answered. The only time this conflict could have qualified as an in-
ternational armed conflict would have been when the United States invaded
Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were inte-
grated into the Taliban forces, the de facto army of Afghanistan. At present, as
noted previously, both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as insurgents in Af-
ghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal armed con-
flict. The conflict in Afghanistan may even be within the scope of Additional
Protocol II because arguably the Taliban and Al-Qaeda exercise such control over
parts of southern Afghanistan as to enable them “to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations.” These operations, the argument would continue, con-
stitute “protracted” internal armed violence rather than just “isolated and
sporadic” armed violence.
Assuming arguendo the validity of these arguments, they do not pertain outside
of Afghanistan, and Al-Qaeda violence in other places would not seem to fall
within the scope of Additional Protocol II. It must be noted, however, that the
19
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United States is not a party to Additional Protocol II, and it is debatable whether
the Protocol’s definition of an internal armed conflict is part of customary interna-
tional law. Alternatively, some commentators have argued that the law of armed
conflict, or international humanitarian law, is a “living” body of doctrine that aims
to protect people to the maximum extent possible and thus should be interpreted
in a way that fills gaps. They point to the Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadic
case to support the proposition that for purposes of Common Article 3, “armed
conflict” should be broadly interpreted to cover as many people as possible.32
Even if the conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda and other militant
or terrorist groups is not an “armed conflict” within the meaning of the law of
armed conflict, it does not necessarily follow that the drone attacks in Pakistan vio-
late international law. As discussed at some length in Professor Pedrozo’s article,
the drone attacks in Pakistan are compatible with the United Nations Charter, spe-
cifically Article 2(4) and Article 51, as an exercise of the right of self-defense.33 For
my purposes, I will comment on only one aspect of the debate over self-defense: Article
51’s requirement that the use of armed force be in response to an armed attack.34
The proper interpretation and application of Article 51 have been the subject of
much debate.35 One of the most hotly debated issues has been whether Article 51
simply preserves the right of self-defense as it existed under customary interna-
tional law prior to adoption of the Charter or places further limits on that right.
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, the test most cited by the commentators for
judging whether the use of force was justified as an act of self-defense was that of
US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in the Caroline case, i.e., whether the “neces-
sity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.”36
The words “if an armed attack occurs” have raised the issue as to whether
Article 51 has limited the scope of the self-defense doctrine. Some have argued that
the words should be read narrowly so as to eliminate the possibility of anticipatory
self-defense that other commentators have argued is available under the Caroline
criteria.37 There is no need to try to resolve this debate for present purposes, be-
cause there is no doubt that US and coalition forces have been subject to numerous
and continuous armed attacks by Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces based in the FATA
and that the use of armed force in the form of drones is necessary to try to prevent
the continuation of such attacks. Moreover, as President Obama has recognized,
the United States “cannot tolerate a safe-haven for terrorists whose location is
known, and whose intentions are clear,”38 because it is difficult, if not impossible,
to win a conflict against insurgents if they are able to retreat to a safe haven in
another country.
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In sum, then, it appears that the claim that the CIA use of drones in Afghanistan
and Pakistan is incompatible with international law is not well-founded. But
merely having the better legal case in this argument may constitute a pyrrhic vic-
tory if the use of drones results in Al-Qaeda and the Taliban gaining more popular
support in Afghanistan and Pakistan and increased recruits for their forces.
In his article Professor Pedrozo denies that the use of drones has resulted in
more popular support for Al-Qaeda and the Taliban or has in any way assisted Al-
Qaeda recruitment efforts. To support his contention, Pedrozo points out that the
arguments of opponents are based on exaggerated civilian casualty figures and use-
fully notes the results of various independent studies indicating, inter alia, that
drone strikes have effectively impaired Al-Qaeda operations and have not aided Al-
Qaeda recruitment efforts.39
Although the results of these studies are encouraging, I am not entirely con-
vinced that they demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Al-Qaeda and Taliban propa-
ganda. For example, although they demonstrate that civilian casualty figures are
exaggerated, it is not clear that this message is effectively bought home to either the
Afghan or Pakistani government or, more important, the large coterie of young
Muslim men who are the primary target of Al-Qaeda and Taliban propaganda.
General Stanley A. McChrystal, who was in charge of US forces in Afghanistan
until he was removed by President Obama in June 2010 because of unacceptable
remarks made about the President’s national security team to a journalist writing
for Rolling Stone magazine, responded to pressure from the Karzai government
and human rights advocates who claimed that US drone and other armed attacks
were resulting in unacceptable numbers of Afghan civilian deaths by issuing a di-
rective that placed significant restrictions on US troops attacking people suspected
of being militants or destroying buildings used to harbor insurgents. Troops widely
complained that the restrictions exposed them to excess risk by limiting their right
to use force in self-defense. When General David H. Petraeus, who was appointed
to replace McChrystal, took over command of American and NATO forces on July
4, 2010, he was faced with a difficult choice. On the one hand, he was sensitive to
the need of his troops to protect themselves. On the other, the restrictions were re-
portedly popular with Afghan officials and human rights advocates who claimed
that the restrictions had led to a significant reduction in Afghan civilian deaths.40
At this writing Petraeus is reportedly ready to issue a new tactical directive that will
expand restrictions on artillery strikes and aerial bombardment but clarify that
troops have the right to self-defense. His goal will reportedly be to “persuade the
troops that the unpopular rules will pay off in trust won on the ground.”41
On August 1, 2010, Petraeus distributed counterinsurgency guidelines to
troops. Reportedly, a large part of these guidelines, written by General Petraeus, is
21
John F. Murphy
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:03 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
aimed at the information side of the war. For example, he writes, “Be first with the
truth. Beat the insurgents and malign actors to the headlines.” “Avoid premature
declarations of success.” “Strive to underpromise and overdeliver.” When things
go wrong, he says, tell the truth: “Avoid spinning, and don’t try to ‘dress up’ an ugly
situation. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, including civilian casualties, and
then state how we’ll respond and what we’ve learned.” “Live our values,” he writes.
“This is what distinguishes us from our enemies.”42
As was the case when he was in command of US and coalition forces in Iraq,
General Petraeus has long understood that there is no purely military solution to
the conflict in Afghanistan, and that success on the information side is crucial to a
political resolution. One hopes that this does not prove to be a mission impossible
in Afghanistan.43
Before turning away from drones to other examples of unmanned systems and
unmanned vehicles, it should be noted that on August 3, 2010, the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a suit in a US district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against alleged improper US gov-
ernmental interference with the right of legal representation.44 According to the
complaint, the plaintiffs were retained by Nasser Al-Aulaqi to provide legal repre-
sentation in connection with the government’s reported decision to add his son,
US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi, to its list of suspected terrorists approved for targeted
killings. Regulations of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) make it illegal
for attorneys to provide legal services to any individual whose assets have been
blocked on the basis of his being a terrorist without a license from OFAC. In the
absence of such a license it would be a criminal offense under OFAC regulations for
the plaintiffs to file a lawsuit on Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s father’s behalf seeking to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of his US citizen son.
On July 23, 2010, the plaintiffs submitted to OFAC an application to provide
“uncompensated legal representation to Nasser al-Aulaqi as representative of the
interests of his son, Anwar al-Aulaqi, who remains in hiding” in Yemen.45 OFAC
refused to grant the requested license. The plaintiffs contend, among other things,
that they have a First Amendment right to represent clients in litigation consistent
with their organizational missions.
Elsewhere in their complaint the plaintiffs make it clear that they wish to “repre-
sent Nasser al-Aulaqi in connection with the government’s reported decision to
add his son to its list of suspected terrorists approved for targeted killings”46 and
plan to file a lawsuit to block the government’s plan.
On August 30, 2010, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for
Constitutional Rights filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia on behalf of Nasser Al-Aulaqi, on his own behalf, and as “Next
22
Mission Impossible? International Law and the Changing Character of War
Vol 87.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 87\_Ventura\Vol 87.vp
Friday, June 10, 2011 9:03:03 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
Friend” of his son Anwar Al-Aulaqi seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against the US government.47 In particular, the plaintiff sought a declaration from
the court that the US Constitution and international law prohibit the government
from
carrying out targeted killings outside of armed conflict except as a last resort to protect
against concrete, specific and imminent threats of death or serious physical injury; and
an injunction prohibiting the targeted killing of US citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi outside
this narrow context. Plaintiff also sought an injunction requiring the government to
disclose the standards under which it determines whether US citizens can be targeted
for death.48
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights were
able to file this lawsuit on Mr. Al-Aulaqi’s behalf because the Treasury Depart-
ment, reversing its earlier position, granted them a license to do so. The lawsuit
challenging the Treasury’s regulations is, at this writing, still pending.49
On December 7, 2010, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed
Nasser Al-Aulaqi’s suit in an eighty-three-page opinion on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.50 The court ruled that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the
suit and that the political question doctrine barred the court from considering the
merits of the plaintiff’s suit.
Other Unmanned Systems/Unmanned Vehicles: The Rise of Robotics
Most, some would say too much, of the present focus on the changing character of
weapon systems has been on drones. It is arguable that drones are the tip of the ice-
berg and that in the not too distant future they will be replaced by new technologi-
cal marvels created by the rising science of robotics. Because of the exponential
growth of robots and their use in armed conflict, the line between science and sci-
ence fiction has become ever more blurred.
Although drones are unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, it is noteworthy that
they are controlled by human operators, many of them located in Nevada—or at
least normally they are controlled. As noted previously, one of the documents re-
leased by WikiLeaks reported that communications were lost with a Reaper drone,
armed with Hellfire missiles and 500-pound bombs, in Afghanistan and it was nec-
essary to order an F-15 fighter aircraft to shoot it down to prevent it from crossing
into Tajikistan.51 There are other examples of military technology running amok.
For example, in his groundbreaking book, Wired for War, P.W. Singer describes
the following incident:
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Just before nine in the morning on October 12, 2007, the 10th Anti-Aircraft Regiment
began its role in the South African military’s annual Seboka training exercise. The op-
eration involved some five-thousand troops from seventeen other units, so the pres-
sure was on to get everything right. But the unit’s automated MK5 antiaircraft system,
sporting two 35 mm cannons linked up to a computer, appeared to jam. As a follow-up
report recounts, this apparently “caused a ‘runaway.’” The description of what hap-
pened next is chilling. “There was nowhere to hide. The rogue gun began firing wildly,
spraying high-explosive shells at a rate of 550 a minute, swinging around through 360
degrees like a high-pressure hose.”
The young female officer in charge rushed forward to try to shut down the robotic gun,
but, continues the report, “she couldn’t, because the computer gremlin had taken
over.” The automated gun shot her and she collapsed to the ground. The gun’s auto-
loading magazines held five hundred high-explosive rounds. By the time they were
emptied, nine soldiers were dead (including the officer) and fourteen seriously injured,
all because of what was later called a “software glitch.”52
As Singer’s tour de force makes clear, robots are now operating in the air, on
land, and in and under the sea. An early, and crucially important, use of robots on
land was as part of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team that was responsi-
ble for disarming and disposing of IEDs. The robots involved in this exercise are
called PackBots. They have proven to be very efficient at their jobs, and as a team’s
commander quoted by Singer reportedly put it, “when a robot dies, you don’t have
to write a letter to his mother.”53
The use of robots has increased exponentially. For example, in Iraq in 2003,
when the US and coalition forces invaded, there were no robotic units on the
ground. By the end of 2005, they numbered 2,400, and by 2008, they were esti-
mated to reach 12,000.54 Initially, they were used for non-killing purposes, such as
disabling or destroying IEDs or for surveillance, but increasingly, like the aerial
drones, they have been used to kill enemies and destroy enemy property.
For example, the TALON is a robot used in Iraq as part of an EOD team. But its
manufacturer, Foster-Miller Inc., remodeled the TALON into a “killer app,” the
Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System, or SWORDS.
The new design allows soldiers to mount various weapons on the robot, including
“an M-16 rifle, a machine gun, and a grenade or rocket launcher.” Another example
is the MARCBOT (Multi-Function Agile Remote-Controlled Robot). According
to Singer:
One of the smallest but most commonly used robots in Iraq, the MARCBOT looks like
a toy truck with a video camera mounted on a tiny, antenna-like mast. Costing only
$5,000, this miniscule bot is used to scout for enemies and to search under cars for
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hidden explosives. The MARCBOT isn’t just notable for its small size; it was the first
ground robot to draw blood in Iraq. One unit of U.S. soldiers jury-rigged their
MARCBOTs to carry Claymore anti-personnel mines. If they thought an insurgent was
hiding in an alley, they would send a MARCBOT down first and, if they found some-
one waiting in ambush, take him out with the Claymore.55
As Singer makes exhaustively clear, there are numerous kinds of military robots in
use, including those with the capacity to kill, on land, in the air, and on or under the
sea.56 It is clear, moreover, that their numbers will continue to increase. As Singer
notes,
[a]t a congressional hearing on February 8, 2000, it finally all came together for military
robotics on the “demand” side. Senator John Warner from Virginia, the powerful
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, laid down a gauntlet, mandating
into the Pentagon’s budget that by 2010, one-third of all the aircraft designed to attack
behind enemy lines be unmanned, and that by 2015, one-third of all ground combat
vehicles be driverless.57
After the Al-Qaeda terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, according to Singer, one
robotics executive was told by his Pentagon buyers that his company should “make
’em [robots] as fast as you can.”58
For purposes of legal analysis of the legal issues these robots currently or might
in the future raise, Darren Stewart has usefully broken them down into two catego-
ries: automated and autonomous.59 “Automated” has been defined thus: “[a] soci-
ety is automated when its production is dominated by machines to the extent that
machines are given priority over men in the performance of human tasks.”60 This
clearly is the situation envisaged by Senator Warner’s mandate to the Pentagon of
2000. “Autonomous” is defined as “self-governing, independent.”61
The crucial difference between the two categories of robots would seem to be
that the automated robots are, at least theoretically, fully under the control of a hu-
man being, or to use the military term, there is a “human in the loop.” By contrast,
autonomous robots are independent of human control and, some would argue,
because of artificial intelligence have become more intelligent, more capable than
humans and, as a result, are better positioned to make crucial life-and-death deci-
sions in war.62
The problem, as noted by Stewart, is that at present there are no autonomous
weapon systems in use, with the exception of one South Korean system used in the
demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas.63 Hence, only the automated robots
currently raise issues of the legality of their use. For their part, possible legal issues
involving the use of autonomous robots are currently a matter of pure speculation.
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By definition, automated robots have a human in the loop who has the ultimate
responsibility for what the automated robot does. The human in the loop would
therefore have the responsibility to ensure that in selecting its targets a military kill-
ing robot adhered to the principles of the law of armed conflict, including military
necessity, proportionality and distinction, and would suffer the consequences of a
failure on the part of the robot to do so. It is important to note decisions to shoot
cannot be delegated to a computer.
Perhaps the most tragic example of a failure to rely on human judgment, rather
than that of a computer, was the July 3, 1988 incident involving a patrol mission of
the USS Vincennes in the Persian Gulf. On that day the radar system of the
Vincennes, called Aegis, spotted Iran Air Flight 655, an Airbus passenger jet, flying
on a consistent course and speed and broadcasting a radar and radio signal that
showed it to be a civilian aircraft. The automated radar system of the Vincennes,
however, had been designed for use against attacking Soviet bombers in the open
ocean of the North Atlantic, not for dealing with skies crowded with civilian air-
craft like those over the Gulf. The computer system assigned the plane an icon that
on the screen made it appear to be an Iranian F-14 fighter. Singer recounts the
tragic denouement of this incident:
Though the hard data were telling the human crew that the plane wasn’t a fighter jet,
they trusted the computer more. Aegis was in semi-automatic mode, giving it the least
amount of autonomy, but not one of the 18 sailors and officers in the command crew
challenged the computer’s wisdom. They authorized it to fire. (That they even had the
authority to do so without seeking permission from more senior officers in the fleet, as
their counterparts on any other ship would have had to do, was itself a product of the
fact that the Navy had greater confidence in Aegis than in a human-crewed ship with-
out it.) Only after the fact did the crew members realize that they had accidentally shot
down an airliner, killing all 290 passengers and crew, including 66 children.64
As Yoram Dinstein notes, civilian airliners carrying civilian passengers are “sin-
gled out for special protection.”65 He cites the Vincennes incident, however, as an
example of the reality that “the speed of modern electronics often creates grave
problems of erroneous identification.”66 Singer adds, quoting retired Army colonel
Thomas Adams, that the coming weapons “will be too fast, too small, too numer-
ous, and will create an environment too complex for humans to direct.”67
If the “coming weapons” will be too complex for humans to direct, someone, or,
more precisely perhaps, something, will have to take over the job. Here we enter
into the murky world of artificial intelligence, or AI. And here also we move from
automated robotics to autonomous robotics.
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It is, however, debatable, to say the least, whether artificial intelligence will ever
progress to the point where robots will be in a position to apply, on their own, such
vital principles of armed conflict as military necessity, proportionality and distinc-
tion. The argument against artificial intelligence ever progressing to this point is
based, at least in part, on the reality that robots lack the moral sense that humans
possess, the capacity to make an empathic response, and in general the ability to
draw on their humanity.
In his book, Singer quotes a senior military analyst at Human Rights Watch, a
leading human rights non-governmental organization, to illustrate the problems
that would be caused by the complete absence of a human element in the targeted
killing environment:
“You can’t just download international law into a computer. The situations are com-
plicated; it goes beyond black-and-white decisions.” He explains how figuring out le-
gitimate military targets is getting more difficult in war, especially as conflict actors
increasingly fight in the midst of civilian areas like cities and even use civilians for
cover. Citing examples he dealt with in his own career, he asks, if a tank is parked inside
a schoolyard, is it legitimate to strike? How about if it is driving out of the village and a
group of children catch a ride on top?68
There is also the tricky issue of accountability for war crimes. As Dinstein notes
in his treatise, “War crimes, like all other international crimes, have two constitu-
ent elements: (a) the criminal act (acteus reus) and (b) a criminal intent or at least a
criminal consciousness (mens rea).”69 But a robot has no capacity for either a crim-
inal intent or a criminal consciousness. Moreover, as a practical matter, it would
make no sense to apply criminal penalties to robots. Accordingly, even if the day
may come when it will be possible to have fully autonomous robots, it will still be
necessary to have a human in the loop, at least in a position of command responsi-
bility. In other words, the robots would not be totally autonomous but subject to
the commands of a human commander. As Dinstein has instructed:
A commander bears criminal responsibility not only for orders that he issues to his
subordinates to commit war crimes. He is answerable for his acts of omission as much
as for his acts of commission. These acts of omission relate to failure of proper supervi-
sion and control by a commander, designed to ensure that his subordinates do not per-
petrate war crimes on their own initiative. Of course, the same commander may be
individually accountable twice: once for having given orders to his subordinates to
commit certain war crimes, and additionally for knowingly allowing them to commit
other war crimes which go beyond those orders.70
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To be sure, a commander would not be responsible for a robot deciding on its
own to commit a violation of the law of armed conflict, unless he or she was aware
that such violations were taking place and was in a position to take steps to exercise
the necessary effective command and control to prevent or at least bring to a halt
such violations. If the robot’s actions were caused by a design defect, the remedy
might be a civil action in tort against the manufacturer of the robot or perhaps the
software engineer involved in the manufacturing process rather than a criminal
proceeding.71
II. Challenges Posed by the Use of Force in Cyberspace
One challenge posed by the use of force in cyberspace may be similar to a primary
issue arising out of the so-called war on terror: what is the appropriate legal regime
to apply, criminal law and procedure or the law of armed conflict?72 In an essay,
“Computer Network Attacks by Terrorists: Some Legal Dimensions,” published in
2002, I suggested that “the applicable legal regime becomes international criminal
law rather than provisions of the UN Charter governing the use of force and the
maintenance of international peace and security.”73 My conclusion at that time,
however, was premised on the assumption that the use of force in cyberspace did
not involve State sponsorship of the terrorist attack or any other kind of State in-
volvement in the attack. Recent developments call into question the validity of this
assumption.
To be sure, another conclusion I reached in my 2002 essay remains true today:
the majority of computer network attacks “may cause disruption of vital systems
leading to widespread inconvenience, possibly to some degree of public alarm, but
. . . do not directly threaten life.”74 But recent computer network attacks have been
very disruptive indeed. For example, Google, the world’s largest Internet search en-
gine, announced in January 2010 that it had been targeted by hackers in 2009, and
that the attacks resulted in breaches of its security infrastructure and theft of
Google’s intellectual property and other data.75 What made this attack especially
disturbing for the US government was that Google traced the attacks to hackers op-
erating out of China.76 Many have insinuated that the Chinese government partici-
pated in the attacks, especially because the attacks included the hacking of e-mail
accounts belonging to Tibetan human rights activists and journalists,77 but there is
no conclusive evidence of the Chinese government’s involvement in the attacks.
China is not the only traditional economic and military adversary of the United
States that has been linked to cyber attacks in recent years. Hackers located in Rus-
sia carried out an attack on several of Estonia’s government websites in 2007,
prompting many to conclude that the Russian government was either formally or
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informally behind the attacks.78 The attacks came in successive waves, first com-
promising the Estonian government sites, then infiltrating newspapers, television
stations, schools and banks within the country.79 The Russian government denied
any involvement in the cyber disruptions, but the timing was very suspicious be-
cause the attacks occurred the same day that Estonia removed a Soviet-era war
monument from the center of its capital city, Tallinn, a controversial move that
was preceded by months of diplomatic tensions between the two countries and
caused protestors in Moscow to stage several protests.80 The Russian government
was again implicated in computer attacks in 2008 when Georgia’s Internet infra-
structure was barraged with “denial of service” attacks that crippled many of its
main governmental websites.81 As the timing of the cyber attacks coincided exactly
with Russia’s military incursion into Georgia, the Georgia government accused
Russia of carrying out the cyber attacks in coordination with its physical military
operations.82
In addition to US businesses, vital US national defense agencies have been at-
tacked in recent years.83 For example, the Department of Defense was the target of
computer network attacks in 1998, 2003 and 2007, when classified information
was stolen.84 The perpetrators of these attacks were deemed “unknown foreign in-
truders,” but many commentators suggested the presence of Chinese or Russian
footprints, especially since these types of attacks on US national defense systems
are thought to be possible only through foreign State participation.85
It is, however, difficult to respond to cyber attacks when it is uncertain who or
what has engaged in the attack. Hence, the current emphasis appears to be on bol-
stering US cyber security and protecting US infrastructure from intrusions from
criminal hackers, State actors and terrorists. For example, President Barack
Obama is continuing to implement the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative that was created by the George W. Bush administration.86 This program
is intended to unify the efforts of various government agencies to protect
commercial and governmental cyber security, and increase our preparedness for
potential attacks. Goals for this initiative include building an international frame-
work to address computer network attacks and the creation of an identity man-
agement strategy that would balance the privacy and security interests of
individual Internet users.
Despite these efforts, current evidence indicates that the United States is not up
to the task of preventing or mitigating the damage of a large-scale computer net-
work attack. In early 2010 the Pentagon conducted a simulated computer attack
aimed at paralyzing the country’s power grids, communications systems and fi-
nancial networks to see how the government might respond; the results were not
encouraging.87 According to military officers who participated in the simulation,
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the “enemy had all the advantages: stealth, anonymity and unpredictability.”88 No
one could pinpoint which country the attack originated from, thus eliminating the
possibility of any retaliatory action, and the legal authorization to respond to the
attack was unclear because no one could determine “if the attack was an act of van-
dalism, an attempt at commercial theft, or a State-sponsored effort to cripple the
United States, perhaps as a prelude to a conventional war.”89
If, and this is a big if, it proves possible to prove that the cyber attack was State-
sponsored, the issue of whether it constituted an “armed attack” within the mean-
ing of Article 51 of the UN Charter may arise and, even if it amounts to an armed
attack, the kind of response that would meet the criteria of necessity and propor-
tionality could be difficult to determine. Presumably, if the attack resulted in
bringing down power stations, refineries, banks and air traffic control systems with
resultant loss of life and property, this would constitute an armed attack, but ab-
sent such destructive effect, the case is less clear. In his article in this volume, Mi-
chael Schmitt has pointed out that in the cyber attack on Georgia there was no loss
of life or property.90
As the Economist has recently noted, “there are few, if any, rules in cyberspace of
the kind that govern behavior, even warfare, in other domains.”91 To remedy this
lacuna, the Economist suggests that States start talking about arms control on the
Internet. Talks have already begun, but it is not clear how successful they will be. In
another forum I have tried to identify some of the dimensions of the problem:
In the introduction to this study, it is suggested that the rapidity of change in modern
life creates great instability and even chaos in some situations. The rapidity of change is
particularly pronounced in the technological and scientific arenas whose considerable
complexity makes it difficult for the slow-moving treaty process to adapt. A recent ex-
ample of this problem is the dispute between the United States and Russia over how to
counter cyberwar attacks that could wreak havoc on computer systems and the
Internet. Russia favors an international treaty along the lines of those negotiated for
chemical weapons and has pushed hard for that approach. The United States, however,
argues that a treaty is unnecessary and instead advocates improved cooperation among
international law enforcement groups. In the U.S. view, if these groups cooperate to
make cyberspace more secure against criminal intrusions, this will also make
cyberspace more secure against military campaigns. Trying to reach common ground
over an approach is complicated, given that a significant proportion of the attacks
against American targets are coming from China and Russia. Also, Russian calls for
broader international oversight of the Internet have met strong U.S. resistance to
agreements that would allow governments to censor the Internet because they would
provide cover for totalitarian regimes. The United States argues further that a treaty
would be ineffective because it can be impossible to determine if an Internet attack
originated from a government, a hacker loyal to that government, or a rogue acting
independently. The unique challenge of cyberspace is that governments can carry out
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deceptive attacks to which they cannot be linked. After computer attacks in Estonia in
April 2007 and in the nation of Georgia in August 2008, the Russian government de-
nied involvement and independent observers said the attacks could have been carried
out by nationalist sympathizers or by criminal gangs. Although the United States and
Russia have failed to reach agreement on the proper approach to counter cyberwar at-
tacks, arms control experts say that major governments are reaching a point of no re-
turn in heading off a cyberwar arms race.92
The United States and Russia have been talking about the possibility of entering
into a bilateral agreement. Even if they are able to overcome the obstacles to reach-
ing agreement between them, it is highly unlikely it would prove possible to con-
clude a global agreement. This is because since the early 1990s it has proven almost
impossible to get agreement among the now almost two hundred member States of
the world community on global treaties to deal with the severest problems facing
humanity, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, pandemics,
trade protectionism and many more.93 Perhaps reflecting an awareness of this dif-
ficulty, the Economist has suggested “more modest accords, or even just informal
‘rules of the road’ that would raise the political cost of cyber-attacks.” Examples
might include
a deal to prevent the crude “denial-of-service” assaults that brought down Estonian
and Georgian websites with a mass of bogus requests for information; NATO and the
European Union could make it clear that attacks in cyberspace, as in the real world, will
provoke a response; the UN or signatories of the Geneva Conventions could declare
that cyber-attacks on civilian facilities are, like physical attacks with bomb and bullet,
out of bounds in war . . . .94
Whether these or other more “modest” steps would be effective or lead to formal,
“legal” arrangements to establish an arms control regime for cyberspace is
debatable.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that although terrorist groups such as
Al-Qaeda are not thought to possess enough technological capability at present
(without State support) to carry out a major cyber attack that would result in loss
of life and property, it is envisioned that within the next decade they could pose
such a threat.95 Al-Qaeda and its ilk, of course, will not recognize the legitimacy of
either modest, informal or formal legal arrangements to establish an arms control
regime for cyberspace. They also will enjoy certain advantages because of the
asymmetric nature of armed conflict in cyberspace. They will be able to launch a
cyber attack from any place they may be located while disguising their location
through various computer moves. Applying the principles of military necessity,
proportionality and distinction against terrorist cyber attacks will be especially
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challenging since the terrorists may be even more heavily embedded in the civilian
population than usual when launching attacks. William J. Lynn III, US Deputy
Secretary of Defense, recently pointed out some of the advantages enemies of the
United States enjoy in asymmetric cyber warfare:
The low cost of computing devices means that U.S. adversaries do not have to build ex-
pensive weapons, such as stealth fighters or aircraft carriers, to pose a significant threat
to U.S. military capabilities. A dozen determined computer programmers can, if they
find a vulnerability to exploit, threaten the United States’ global logistics network, steal
its operational plans, blind its intelligence capabilities, or hinder its ability to deliver
weapons on target. Knowing this, many militaries are developing offensive capabilities
in cyberspace, and more than 100 foreign intelligence organizations are trying to break
into U.S. networks. Some governments already have the capacity to disrupt elements of
the U.S. information infrastructure.
In cyberspace, the offense has the upper hand. The Internet was designed to be collabo-
rative and rapidly expandable and to have low barriers to technological innovation;
security and identity management were lower priorities. For these structural reasons,
the U.S. government’s ability to defend its networks always lags behind its adversaries’
ability to exploit U.S. networks’ weaknesses. Adept programmers will find vulnerabili-
ties and overcome security measures put in place to prevent intrusions. In an offense-
dominant environment, a fortress mentality will not work. The United States cannot
retreat behind a Maginot Line of firewalls or it will risk being overrun. Cyberwarfare is
like maneuver warfare, in that speed and agility matter most. To stay ahead of its pur-
suers, the United States must constantly adjust and improve its defenses.96
Later in his essay Lynn notes that it will be necessary to adopt a new approach to
deterrence, expresses doubts about the feasibility of traditional arms control regimes,
and suggests the need for a new approach to international behavior in cyberspace:
Given these circumstances, deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any
benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation. The challenge is to
make the defenses effective enough to deny an adversary the benefit of an attack despite
the strength of offensive tools in cyberspace. (Traditional arms regimes would likely
fail to deter cyberattacks because of the challenges of attribution, which make verifica-
tion of compliance almost impossible. If there are to be international norms of behav-
ior in cyberspace, they may have to follow a different model, such as that of public
health or law enforcement.)97
In short the legal and technological challenges the United States faces in re-
sponding effectively to the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare are daunting, and
success is not assured. Meeting these challenges is especially difficult when US
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forces are forced to adopt a purely defensive posture. In traditional armed conflict,
it is the offensive power of the US military that affords it such a marked advantage.
As the various panels at the conference demonstrated, however, in asymmetric
warfare the United States, more often than not, finds itself on the defensive. The
next, and concluding, section of this article considers a few more dimensions of the
asymmetry problem and the impact they have on the chances of US forces succeed-
ing in their mission.
III. The Multifaceted Nature of Asymmetric Warfare
As Professor Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg points out,98 one of a number of possi-
ble definitions of asymmetric warfare is that it is warfare where one of the parties to
the armed conflict tries to compensate for its perceived disadvantages vis-à-vis the
other party or parties by adopting methods and strategies that are clear violations
of the law of armed conflict, e.g., perfidy, suicide bombings and the use of human
shields, especially civilians. What is particularly disturbing about asymmetric war-
fare is that violators of the law of armed conflict gain considerable military advan-
tage in many instances by the adoption of such tactics because they can be
extremely effective in countering the normally vastly superior military capabilities
of the other party.
Both in Iraq and in Afghanistan the enemy consists of insurgents who embed
themselves into the civilian populations, a clear violation of the law of armed con-
flict. In Iraq a standard tactic of the insurgents was to use children as human shields
in firefights with US and coalition forces. In Afghanistan, as noted earlier in this ar-
ticle, there have been sharp factual disputes between NATO and local residents
over whether NATO air raids have resulted in civilian deaths, as alleged by the local
residents, or, as contended by NATO, in the deaths of insurgents who had opened
fire on NATO forces before they were killed.99 Regardless of which side is correct in
this debate, the result has been a substantial reduction in the number of airstrikes.
General Charles Dunlap, a retired US Air Force judge advocate, regards the de-
cision in Afghanistan to sharply reduce the number of airstrikes as a serious mis-
take. He contends that “it is often overlooked that during the surge [in Iraq],
thousands of insurgents were captured or killed by American special operation
forces and airstrikes. I do believe, firmly, that the much-derided killing and captur-
ing actually was the key to success.”100 In support of his argument Dunlap adds that
during the Iraq surge, airstrikes increased to five times previous levels.
US military officers in Afghanistan counter these arguments by claiming that
special operations raids in 2010 resulted in the deaths of hundreds of militant
leaders, while the restrictions on airpower saved Afghan lives and improved
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relations with the government. Others argue that the Iraqis themselves were re-
sponsible for the reduction of violence: Sunni insurgents who turned against Al-
Qaeda, and Shiite militias who embraced a ceasefire with the Sunni.101 For his
part, James Dubik, a retired lieutenant general who oversaw the training of the
Iraqi military during the surge, reportedly stated: “The decisiveness of the surge
came from an aggregate of factors—more like a thunderstorm than a single cause
and effect.”102 He believes that General Petraeus will look for the same aggregate
effect in Afghanistan.
In both Iraq and Afghanistan, however, as well as more generally in the world-
wide conflict (no longer “war”) with Al-Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups, the
struggle for “hearts and minds” or, if one prefers, the “propaganda war” is of cru-
cial importance. And as indicated earlier in this article, it appears that the enemy
has been able to counter the advantages that the United States and its allies would
normally enjoy. Perhaps the most recent example of this is the apparent impact of
the current debate in the United States over whether a mosque should be permit-
ted to be built in the vicinity of where the Twin Towers were destroyed on 9/11.
Some exceedingly inflammatory negative remarks about Islam made by some op-
ponents of building the mosque in that vicinity have reportedly resulted in signifi-
cant increases in the number of recruits for Al-Qaeda. The First Amendment
protects such remarks, but unwittingly they constitute grist for Al-Qaeda’s propa-
ganda mill.
At this writing, the papers are full of still another dispute between NATO and
Afghan officials over the results of a NATO airstrike.103 According to Afghan offi-
cials, the airstrike hit the election convoy of an Afghan parliamentary candidate,
wounding him and killing as many as ten campaign aides. But the NATO version is
that the strike killed a senior militant leader. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,
who was visiting Afghanistan at the time, reportedly stated that the airstrike tar-
geted and killed a “very senior official” from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
or IMU, a militant group the United States has designated as a terrorist organiza-
tion.104 NATO officials said that the airstrike killed and injured up to twelve insur-
gents after NATO forces identified several armed men in a sedan that was part of a
six-car convoy. Only the sedan was hit, they said.
There seems to be no current mechanism in Afghanistan for resolving these dis-
putes over the results of NATO airstrikes. But there also seems to be little doubt
that, regardless of their veracity, frequent reports of attacks resulting in civilian
casualties are undermining the counterinsurgency effort, which is aimed at pro-
tecting the population and shoring up support for the Afghan government.
Two other factors loom large when one is considering the problem of civilian
deaths arising from the armed conflict in Afghanistan. The first, as noted before, is
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the difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and civilians in asymmetric
warfare. The second, it is important to note, is that the United Nations has re-
ported that 70 percent of civilians who die in violence in Afghanistan are killed by
insurgents.105
Yet it is always the United States and NATO who are on the defensive when
claims of civilian casualties are raised. In his concluding remarks at the conference,
Yoram Dinstein deplored this constantly defensive posture. As he pointed out, the
enemy has successfully engaged in lawfare, the use and abuse of legal argument, to
leave the impression that the law of armed conflict demands there be no civilian
casualties. It does not, of course, and this reality should be aggressively brought
home to the people of Afghanistan and elsewhere. It should also be brought home
to them that the enemy constantly engages in lawless behavior and, as pointed out
by the United Nations, consistently kills its own civilians in armed conflict.
Dinstein’s call for the United States and its allies to abandon their defensive posture
and take the offense to demonstrate, stressing their own efforts to comply with the
law of armed conflict, the lawlessness and brutality of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and
their ilk is compelling.106
The enemies in both Iraq and Afghanistan are insurgents, and the United States
and its allies are involved in counterinsurgency in both countries. General Petraeus
was in charge of the counterinsurgency in Iraq and has now assumed a similar role
in Afghanistan. He was, moreover, the primary architect of the 2006 U.S. Army/
Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.107 The Manual, regarded as the
“bible” of counterinsurgency, raises the crucial issue of the time required for a
well-run counterinsurgency strategy to work. Sara Sewall, a former Pentagon offi-
cial who wrote the introduction to the University of Chicago edition of the manual,
for one is skeptical that the US public will be willing to “supply greater concentra-
tions of forces, accept higher casualties, fund serious nation-building and stay
many long years to conduct counterinsurgency by the book.”108 In light of current
developments, with the withdrawal of all US combat troops from Iraq—amid indi-
cations that the Iraqi army and police may not be able to provide adequate security
on their own109—and a plan to start withdrawing combat troops from Afghanistan
in the summer of 2011, Sewall’s skepticism would appear well justified.
Notes
1. See Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo, Use of Unmanned Systems to Combat Terrorism, which is
Chapter IX in this volume, at 217, 218–19.
2. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Paki-
stan, 2004–2009, at 8 (Notre Dame Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144.
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